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Abstract 
If Tunisia was hailed as a success story with its high rankings on economic, educational, and 
other indicators compared to other Arab countries, the 2011 popular uprisings demonstrate the 
need for political reforms but also major economic reforms. The Arab spring highlights the 
fragility of its main economic pillars including the tourism and the foreign direct investment. 
In such turbulent times, the paper examines the economic impact of migrant’ remittances, 
expected to have a countercyclical behavior. Our results reveal that prior to the Arab Spring, 
the impacts of remittances on growth and consumption seem negative and positive 
respectively, while they varyingly influence local investment. These three relationships held 
in the short-run. By considering the period surrounding the 2011 uprisings, the investment 
effect of remittances becomes negative and weak in the short- and medium-run, whereas 
positive and strong remittances’ impacts on growth and consumption are found in the long 
term. 
Keywords: Remittances; economic growth; domestic investment; consumption; Tunisia; 
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1.         Introduction 
On 17 December 2010, a young Tunisian street merchant, Mohamed Bouazizi set 
himself on fire that ended his life and sparked unrest sweeping in Tunisia. His tragic suicide 
was seen as an act of despair, humiliation and protest of the explosive problems confronted by 
the majority of Tunisians who were no longer prepared to accept inequalities, corruption, lack 
of freedoms, unemployment, etc. The winds of change that swept across Tunisia triggered a 
“domino” effect in different Arab countries including Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen. The 
term “Arab Spring” has come to present these popular revolutions. In the afternoon of the 
euphoria of the 2011 protests, Tunisia experienced an evolving volatility and growth slow-
moving. Before the downfall of the 23 year-old regime of Ben Ali, Tunisia was one of the 
widely cited development success stories in the Middle Eastern and North African region, and 
was portrayed as a “top reformer” as far as institutional reform was concerned (Pollack 2011). 
Its economic is more prosperous with a growth rate in 2011 projected to exceed 5 percent, 
outpacing low-middle-income countries’ averages. Thanks to the 1986 structural adjustment 
program and the macro-economic improvement called ‘economic miracle” beginning in the 
late 1990s, the country has also succeeded to keep its domestic and external economic 
imbalances under control. Further, there have been positive advances in education and women 
rights. However, issues of youth unemployment, corruption, civil and political rights and 
unequal wealth distribution have received much less attention. In fact, despite a marked 
economic and educational progress, the social conditions of the Tunisian people have 
deteriorated, and the corruption and inequalities have reached a very high level. It comes as 
no surprise that popular uprising occurs in such framework. 
The Arab Spring has produced immediate negative repercussions on economic 
development. So, there has a sharp decrease of the annual growth: 1 percent per year between 
2011 and 2015. The national economic base suffered. According to the National Institute of 
Statistics of Tunisia, the foreign direct investment (FDI) plunged by 7.6 percent in 2016 
compared to 2010. Also, tourist arrivals and revenues collapsed by 30.8 and 35.1 percent, 
respectively, and the dinar depreciated substantially. It is expected that a decrease in tourist 
arrivals can have a large effect on the Tunisian economy since tourism is a source of direct 
employment and foreign currency reserves. Further, the trade deficit rose markedly to reach 
13.6 percent of GDP.  
In order to alleviate the adverse effects of such political instability on economic 
outcomes, there is a need for considering counter-cyclical financing mechanisms and other 
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pillars of Tunisia economy. The most tangible of these are migrant’ remittances, the income 
that migrant send home, potentially leading to cushion the harmful effects of this political and 
social upheaval. In fact, in times of crises (2008 and 2011), remittance flows showed a 
resilience (World Bank 2012). Nevertheless, these financial flows had not attracted so much 
attention from successive Tunisian governments, unlike other countries such as Morocco 
where they have been and are still being one of the major sources of financing the economy 
(Bouoiyour 2006).  
In this study, we test whether remittances may boost economic development, stabilize 
consumption fluctuations and stimulate investment activities with reference to the case of 
Tunisia witnessing the 2011 Arab Spring unrest. While a large strand of literature has focused 
on how remittance inflows interact with economic growth and investment (Glystos 2002, 
Fayissa and Nsiah 2008, Yang 2008, Tansel and Yasar 2009, Barajas et al. 2009, among 
others), very little was devoted in the literature to the stabilizing effects of remittances on 
consumption variations. In fact, One of the most threatening impacts of output shocks is the 
consumption instability which negatively influences agents’ welfare (for instance, Bhaumik 
and Nugent 1999, Kedir and Girma 2003, Castaldo and Reilly 2007). Also, a limited number 
of studies have analyzed the ability of remittances to act as a buffer against shocks (Lueth and 
Ruiz-Arranz 2007, Chami et al. 2005). This paper extends previous literature in the following 
important aspects. First, it simultaneously examines the remittances’ impacts on economic 
growth, domestic investment and consumption.  It is necessary to note that a few attempts 
have been made to empirically investigate the development impacts of remittances in 
Tunisian case (Mesnard 2005, Jouini 2015 and Kouni 2016). Second, it seeks to identify 
through which channels remittances can spur Tunisia’s growth during turbulent times. Third, 
it revisits the relationship between remittances and macroeconomic variables placing 
particular attention on possible nonlinear relationship. The majority of previous researches on 
the issue has ignored the non-linearity of the relationship between remittances and economic 
development or has employed a quadratic term to capture nonlinearity. With respect to the 
remittances effects on macroeconomy, Ruiz et al. (2009) showed a positive link between 
remittances and economic growth in parametric estimations, whereas such a relationship 
disappears when nonlinearity is taken into account using semi-parametric and non-parametric 
methods. Besides, Hassan et al. (2012), by analyzing the effects of inward remittances flows 
on per capita GDP growth in Bangladesh during the period 1974-2006, argued that the 
developmental impact of remittances may not be linear. Accurately, they found a U-shaped 
relationship that exists between remittances and long-term total factor productivity growth, 
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where the impact of remittances flows on growth is initially negative but becomes positive 
later on. They attributed these outcomes to the “unproductive” use of remittances in the 
beginning followed by “more productive” utilization in late stages. In line with these findings, 
our empirical strategy seeks to verify the non-linear linkage between remittances and some 
macroeconomic variables. However, our approach is different to the existing literature 
because we are able to address such relationship in an unstable framework using a novel 
empirical strategy that accounts for nonlinearity pattern. To avoid misspecification biases 
from imposing an arbitrary functional form, we apply a new data analysis tool, namely 
Empirical Mode Decomposition (EMD), which decomposes each time series into a scale-on-
scale basis and at each scale it is estimated the correlation. The motivation behind the use of 
this technique arises in the desire to extract intrinsic characteristics inherent to the time series. 
Prior research has been performed by employing different techniques, in particular a 
cointegration analysis or an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL). Listing all existing 
estimators is definitely beyond the scope of this study. As the existing literature on the 
relationship between remittances and macroeconomic variables is rather inconclusive, it 
warrants for further empirical investigation. Sun and Meinl (2012) claimed that most data 
convey noises that are caused by intricate structure of irregularities and roughness. They thus 
use wavelet analysis to denoise the data and to avoid the manifold irregularities along with 
different time-scales and frequency components. Every component resulting from a wavelet 
transform has parameters that determine its scale and level over time which avoids the 
possible non-stationarity problem. But it would be more appropriate to have a transform that 
would not solely allow dealing with non-stationarity problem, but also carrying out an 
adaptive transform basis. A successful data assessment is heavily sensitive to the choice of 
data-scale representation, and its ability to provide reliable and robust data-association metrics 
for real data. For this purpose, it is important to account for scales which are free from rigid 
mathematical constraints and data driven to reflect the inherent movements embedded in the 
data, without a priori knowledge. EMD, in this way, has proven to be effective in a broad 
range of applications for extracting signals from data generated in noisy nonlinear and non-
stationary processes (Huang et al. 1998, 2003; Huang and Attoh-Okine 2005). Recently, a 
particular attention have been given to the Empirical Mode Decomposition given its ability to 
disentangle any signal into its scale components, its flexibility to handle non-stationary data 
and its capacity to provide an alternative representation of the association structure between 
time series on a scale-by-scale basis.  
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Using a multi-scale correlation analysis via the Empirical Mode Decomposition, quite 
interesting results were drawn. Prior to Arab Spring, the short-term hidden factors of 
remittances explain negatively the economic growth, varyingly the local productive 
investment and positively the consumption. These results change fundamentally when 
accounting for the period surrounding Tunisia in the onset of Arab Spring. While the findings 
remain stable for the remittances-investment linkage (negative and weak and driven by short- 
and medium-term factors), the cycles remittances-growth and remittances-consumption 
became positive, greater and explained by long-term inner features. These findings are fairly 
robust to the control for endogeneity bias and to the use of further signal approaches.  
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review on the 
channels through which remittances can enhance economic growth in the developing 
countries. Section 3 gives some stylized facts. Section 4 discusses the methodology and 
provides a brief data overview. Section 5 reports and discusses our results. Section 6 checks 
the robustness of our findings. Section 7 concludes and offers relevant policy implications. 
 
2. Literature review 
           In light of the increasing evidence on the substantial role of remittance flows relative to 
other flows in developing countries, it is not surprising that the last decade was marked by 
tremendous attention by policymakers and academics devoted to their developmental role. A 
wider macroeconomic literature has concentrated in the impact of remittances on growth, 
investment, consumption and monetary and exchange rate policies. The findings, 
nevertheless, are mixed, and sometimes controversial. 
Literature has underscored various channels through which migrant remittances can 
spur economic growth in the developing countries. However, it has proven not easier to fully 
support the idea that remittances provide a boost to economic growth of recipient economies, 
and whether they help lighten economic hardship. Concerning this point, remittances can 
mitigate output growth volatility because of their relative stability. Some papers argued that 
remittances may act as a countercyclical stabilizer in receiving countries. For example, Chami 
et al. (2005) indicated that remittances have a tendency to move counter-cyclically with the 
GDP in recipient countries, consistently with the model’s implication that remittances are 
compensatory transfers. However, Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2007) found that remittance 
receipts in Sri Lanka may be less shock-absorber than usually believed. 
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A limited strand of literature which has tested the direct relationship between 
remittances and economic growth typically showed “multi-sided” outcomes. Estimating panel 
growth regressions both on the full sample of countries (composed of 84 countries) and for 
emerging economies only, Barajas et al. (2009) claimed that remittances had, at best, no 
impact on economic growth. Fayissa and Nsiah (2010) investigated the aggregate impact of 
remittances on the economic growth of 18 Latin American countries for the period 1980–
2005 and showed that a 10 percent increase in remittances led to a 0.15 percent increase in the 
GDP per capita income. Using the Solow growth model, Rao and Hassan (20012) explained 
the impact of remittances on growth by distinguishing between the indirect and direct growth 
effects. They found that these funds were likely to have a positive but modest effect on 
economic growth. These authors identified seven channels through which remittances could 
have indirect growth effects: the volatility of output growth, the exchange rate, the investment 
rate, the financial development, the inflation rate, the foreign direct investment and the current 
government expenditure. To a larger extent, the surveyed literature suggested different 
channels through which remittances could spur economic growth. In the short-run, 
remittances allowed home countries to strengthen the foreign-exchange reserves helping to 
adjust their economy. Nevertheless, the rather extensive literature on remittances provided 
further insights on the effects of remittances on consumption and investment (El-Sakka and 
Mcnabb 1999, Glytsos 2002). Accordingly, for a sample of five Mediterranean countries 
(namely Egypt, Greece, Jordan, Morocco and Portugal), Glytsos (2002) analyzed the 
remittances’ impact on growth and deduced that the good done to growth by rising 
remittances is not as great as the bad done by falling remittances.  
From an economic development viewpoint, a vexing question remains: how 
remittances are used. Are they spent on consumption, or are they used for productive 
investments? Remittances are generally spent on consumption but there is some evidence that 
in the long term international remittances may be channelled into productive investment. In 
this context, some studies looked into the effects of remittances on domestic investment (and 
hence indirectly on growth) and supported these optimistic conclusions. For example, 
Woodruff and Zenteno (2004) analyzed such effects using data of a survey of more than 6,000 
self employed workers and small firm owners located in 44 urban areas of Mexico and 
estimated that more than 40 percent of the capital invested in microenterprises in urban 
Mexico was associated with migrants’ remittances. There is also evidence supporting that 
return migration could increase investment in some developing countries like Egypt 
(McCormick and Wahba 2003, Wahba and Zenou 2009) and Tunisia (Mesnard 2004). 
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Potentially, in countries where access to credit is a major obstacle for entrepreneurship, return 
migration invigorated the propensity of returnees to become self-employed upon return but 
also the positive impact of accumulated savings on the decision to become self-employed. 
Additionally, it has been commonly argued that investment is directly linked to the 
development of financial system (Aggarwal et al 2006, Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2009). By 
analyzing the remittances effects in Tunisia during the period from 1987 to 2012, Kouni 
(2016) argued that remittances have contributed to economic growth. The author showed that 
the amount of remittances allocated to investment is smaller than the remittances allocated to 
consumption. He also indicated that remittances played a potential role on explaining the 
share of the sectoral value added in GDP. In particular, a rise by about 1 percent in 
remittances allocated to investment increase the value added to GDP ratio by 1 percent to 4 
percent. 
Even though remittances allow home countries to strengthen their foreign-exchange 
reserves influencing their macroeconomic equilibrium and GDP growth, the rather extensive 
literature on remittances provides some insights about their detrimental impact on economic 
growth through the effect of the Dutch Disease. This could result from the reduction of the 
competitiveness of the tradable sector after an appreciation of the real exchange rate. This 
logic can be illustrated using the results reported by Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004). The 
authors found, for a sample of 13 Latin American and Caribbean countries, that remittances 
have the potential to inflict economic costs on the export sector of receiving countries by 
inducing a loss of international competitiveness. In the case of Tunisia, Chnaina and 
Makhlouf (2015) showed that an increase in worker’s remittances of 1 percentage point of 
GDP is associated with an appreciation of Tunisia’s real exchange rate by 0.39 per cent3. 
There are other channels through which remittances could affect growth, namely human 
capital and labor supply. Thus, remittances can stimulate investment in human capital and 
health as well (Mansuri 2006, Valero-Gil 2008). They may also influence economic growth 
via their effects on the labor force participation. However, these effects of remittances are 
sensitive to the considered countries. Some migration research showed a negative effect on 
labor supply if remittance income substitutes for labor income. They had also a disincentive 
impact on work and savings in the origin community of migrants i.e., the moral hazard 
phenomenon (Chami et al. 2005), leading to a decrease in labor supply. Nevertheless, as noted 
                                                 
3
  Bouoiyour and Selmi (2016) tested the occurrence of Dutch Disease hypothesis (i.e., whether the increase of 
remittance flows leads to an appreciation of the real effective exchange rate) in the Tunisian case, and provided 
evidence supporting such hypothesis. They further found that this effect operates strongly through the 
differential price and modestly via the nominal effective exchange rate.  
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by Özden and Schiff (2006), such decline in labor supply caused by remittances may prompt 
high productivity.   
 
3. Migration flows and remittances to Tunisia 
Migrants from Tunisia are predominantly destined for Europe, and for historical and 
political reasons, France has attracted the majority of the Tunisian community abroad. 
According to the official data, 1,223,213 Tunisians (i.e. 10 percent of the Tunisian 
population) were residing abroad in 2012, more than 1 million of whom lived in Europe 
(668,668 in France). Tunisian migration flows to traditional European countries like France 
and Germany have increased during the last decades largely owing to family reunification, 
whereas migration to the other destination countries is mainly explained by labour migration. 
This is the case for example of the migration to Gulf countries which is generally temporary, 
responding to economic and political backgrounds in Tunisia and in these host countries. 
High unemployment and recent political instability in the country are potentially the most 
important reasons of emigration. Young and graduate unemployment represents a drama in 
the lives of many individuals in this country. The official data suggest that in 2012, graduate 
unemployment rates (tertiary education level), in Tunisia, stood at 26.1 percent. What is more, 
the high skilled emigration had grown significantly over the past two decades, reflecting the 
selective nature of migration by educational attainment and the general improvement in the 
level of education in this country. Looking at the OECD data about the emigration rate of the 
highly educated persons
4
 in 2010-2011, Tunisia has almost 10 percent of its skilled workforce 
living abroad (OECD 2013). Note that during the time of the revolution, there was a 
significant increase of irregular migration flows towards Europe. A prominent feature linked 
to Tunisian migration is the important funds sent by migrants. They registered a noticeable 
increase during the two last decades. In 1990, international remittances received were around 
$0.5 billion; by 2008, this number rose to $1.9 billion. In 2014, they attained $2.35 billion. 
These official statistics reported by the Central Bank of Tunisia largely underestimate the 
total amount of migrants’ remittances because Tunisian migrants frequently used informal 
modes of transfer. In Tunisia, informal remittances carried by travellers from Europe 
(migrants, family, friends and acquaintances) were estimated to account for 38 percent of total 
remittance receipts (IOM 2011).  
                                                 
4
 The emigration rate of highly educated persons from country i is calculated by dividing the highly educated 
expatriate population from country of origin i by the total highly educated native-born population. Highly 
educated persons correspond to those with a tertiary level of education. 
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The growing importance of remittances to Tunisia is reflected in Figure1 where we 
reported the evolution of these flows as percentage of GDP. Remittances as a share of GDP 
varied between 3.77 and 5.01 percent during the period 1995-2015. As such, remittance 
receipts might exert a significant impact on Tunisian development of Tunisia in a period of 
political and social upheaval. Representing one of the potential sources of foreign currency 
and national saving for Tunisia, these remittances inflows played a pivotal economic role in 
the hardship periods. In fact, remittances represented 28.7 percent of national saving in 2012.  
 
Figure 1. Remittances to Tunisia 
 
    Source: World Bank. 
 
By looking at the Figure 1, we note that neither the 2008 economic crisis nor the 2011 
uprisings exerted strong influence on remittances flows from Tunisian migrants. It should be 
noted that remittances to Tunisia come essentially from Europe and Arab countries. In fact, 
they are widely originated from France, with Germany and Italy trailing far behind. Among 
Arab countries, the Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC)
5
 are the main remittances 
sending countries followed by Libya before the Arab Spring which caused a marked decline 
of remittances sent from Libya. 
 
                                                 
5
 Within the GCC region, the main remittances sending countries in 2013 were the Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates (Central Bank of Tunis 2014).  
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4.         Methodology and data 
It is recognized that the investigation of dynamic interactions between time series is an 
important issue that has long posed challenge to economic agents and academics. In 
investigating remittances effects, most empirical studies use techniques that look for linear 
positive or negative relationships. However, the relationships between remittances and 
macroeconomic variables may be nonlinear, especially when focusing on an unstable context. 
In general, the historical data of time series are the result of complex economic processes 
which include policy shifts, structural changes, sudden shocks, political tensions, among 
others. The combined influence of these various events are the root of distributional 
characteristics of financial and macroeconomic time series such as asymmetry, nonlinearity, 
heavy-tailness and extreme values. Given these considerations, the primary objective of this 
study is revisit the relationship between remittances, economic growth, investment, 
consumption and real effective exchange rate while accounting for the scale-on-scale 
variation (i.e., nonlinearity) and the hidden factors that may drive it.  
The literature is quite rich in methods to assess time-varying correlations. The 
traditional time series analysis tools usually rely on Fourier transforms in one way or another. 
Nevertheless, according to Huang et al. (1998), the Fourier transform might prompt 
inaccurate information owing essentially to the nature (in the time domain) of the transform. 
Even wavelet analysis, developed to deal with non-stationarity and local frequency changes, 
produces confusing and sometimes contradicting results when applied to environment and 
climate signals (Sonechkin and Datsenko 2000, Oh et al. 2003). By performing wavelet 
approach, it is sometimes not easier to determine local frequency changes because the 
spectrum is generated by stepping via several predetermined frequency components showing 
generally blurred findings. Wavelet method has a problem of shift variance. More accurately, 
if the start point varies, by for example dropping the initial point, the wavelet transform may 
reveal distinct outcomes. However, the EMD method makes no assumption about linearity or 
stationarity and the intrinsic mode functions (IMFs) are often easily descibed
6
. A signal can 
be disentangled into a sum of finite number of zero mean oscillating components having 
symmetric envelopes defined by the local maxima and minima. The EMD is based on the 
sequential extraction of energy associated with distinct frequencies ranging from high 
fluctuating components (short-run) to low fluctuating modes (long-run). 
                                                 
6
 For detailed discussion of the EMD technique and comparison to other time series analysis tools, you can refer 
to Huang et al. (1998) and Flandrin et al. (2004).  
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In practice, the IMFs are extracted level by level: first, the high frequency oscillations 
riding on the corresponding low frequency oscillations are identified; then the next level 
highest-frequency local oscillations of the residual of the data are extracted. The sifting 
algorithm to create IMFs in EMD consists of two steps. First, the local extremes in the time 
series data X(t) are identified. Thereafter, all the local maxima are connected by a cubic spline 
line U(t) generating the upper envelope of the time series, and another cubic spline line L(t) 
generating the lower envelope. For this purpose, we initially measure the mean 1m  for 
different points from upper and lower envelopes, given by: 
2/))()((1 tLtUm                                                                                         
(1) 
 
Figure 2. The identification of the upper and lower envelopes and the mean  
 
 
 
Note: The data (blue) upper and lower envelopes (green) defined by the local maxima and minima, respectively, 
and the mean value of the upper and lower envelopes given in red.  
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The difference between the original data and m1 is the first component (Figure 3), 
called h1. 
X(t) –m1 = h1                                                                                                              (2) 
 
Figure 3. The first component: Original signal-m1 
 
 
If the h1 is not an IMF, we have to repeat the sifting process till it reduced to an IMF. 
Then, in the subsequent steps of sifting process, the first component h1 is treated as if it were 
the data, i.e., 
h1 – m11 = h11                                                                                                           (3) 
 
Figure 4. The sifting process 
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The sifting process would be done k times till acceptable tolerance is reached: 
h1(k-1)-m1k=h1k=c1                                                                                                                                                    (4) 
 
If the resulting time series h1k is an IMF, then it is dubbed as c1 which is the real first 
component which satisfies the definition of IMFs (see Figure 5). Equation (2) could be 
rewritten as follows: 
X(t) – c1 = r1                                                                                                     (5) 
 
Figure 5. The first residual component: Original signal –c1 
 
 
Equation (5) will also be repeated many times until the residue (r) becomes a 
monotonic function from which no more IMFs can be extracted
7
. The last residue is the trend 
of the data. Ultimately, equation (5) can be denoted as: 
n
n
i i
rctX  1)(                                                                                                      (6) 
Summing up, the decomposition of the signal into IMFs is carried out as follows: after 
determining the positive peaks (maxima) and negative peaks (minima) of the original signal, 
we construct the lower and the upper envelopes of the signal by the cubic spline method (red). 
In addition, we measure the mean values (blue) by averaging the upper envelope and the 
lower envelope. Besides, we subtract the mean from the original signal to find the first 
intrinsic mode function (IMF1). Then, we calculate the first residual component by 
subtracting IMF1 component from the original signal. Finally, we repeat the steps above until 
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 For more details about the way EMD works, please refer to the following link: http://perso.ens-
lyon.fr/patrick.flandrin/emd.html 
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the final residual component becomes a monotonic function and no more IMFs can be 
extracted. 
After the partition of the original series into different scales each one related to 
different timing frames, at each scale it is estimated the correlation. By using this newly 
econometric tool, it is possible to denoise the original series and look at detail patterns (tees). 
In this way, correlation analysis-based EMD provides a rich source of potential nonlinear 
dynamics depicting temporal dependence. Throughout this study, we consider three 
regressions: (1) the regression of real per capita growth
8
 (gGDP) on remittances to GDP 
(REM/GDP) and potential control variables commonly considered as the main determinants 
of economic growth, including foreign direct investments to GDP (FDI/GDP), investment to 
GDP (INV/GDP), credits to private sector (Credits/GDP), trade openness (or the level of 
exports plus imports to GDP,  noted OPEN) and real effective exchange rate (REER or the 
ratio between prices of tradable and non-tradable goods where an increase in price of tradable 
goods corresponds to a real depreciation); (2) the regression of domestic investment 
(INV/GDP) on remittances and other explanatory variables including (FDI/GDP), gGDP, 
Credits/GDP, OPEN, inflation (CPI), and real interest rate (RIR); and (3) the regression of 
consumption to GDP (CONS/GDP) on remittances, gGDP, Credits/GDP, CPI and RIR. 
Because we have not enough observations to estimate after the Arab Spring, we have made 
two estimates for two different periods: the first one corresponds to the period before the Arab 
Spring spanning between 1990:Q1 and 2010:Q4 (i.e., 85 observations) and the second one 
refers to an extended period (prior to and post Arab Spring event) that spans between 
1990:Q1 and 2015:Q3 (i.e., 104 observations). 
The chosen sampling period is due to data availability. The data on remittances, 
investment, real per capita growth and the additional explanatory variables were collected 
from world development indicators (CD-ROM), quandl website and Econstats
TM
. In order to 
assess the dynamic dependencies (correlation and causality) among the focal variables, we 
have transformed the variables by taking natural logarithms to correct for heteroskedasticity 
and dimensional differences between the investigated time series.  
 
 
                                                 
8
 We have used population series to convert the time series into per capita. 
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5.         Results  
5.1. The decomposition of remittances and macroeconomic variables via EMD 
The fundamental question of this study is beyond the classic debate which opposes the 
remittances impact on consumption with that on investment. This research seeks to test 
whether these linkages evolve over different time-scales (or frequencies). Also, it assesses to 
what extent does Arab Spring strength the remittance matters. Our objective is to spotlight 
how decomposing the variables into intrinsic mode functions can be useful in examining such 
relationships during turbulent times. Unlike standard methods, signal approaches                   
(in particular, a correlation analysis-based EMD approach and a frequency domain causality 
test) permit to uncover the inner factors that may drive the remittances’ effects on growth, 
investment and consumption, which would stay hidden otherwise. 
Figure A.1 (Appendices) displays the EMD outcomes for the variables of interest. We 
show that, for the restricted and the whole period, the real per capita growth, remittances, 
investment and consumption were decomposed into seven IMFs plus one residue. Since the 
number of IMFs is limited and restricted to log2N where N is the length of data
9
, the sifting 
processes produced only seven IMFs for each variable. All the derived IMFs were listed from 
high frequency component to low frequency band, and the last one is the residue. 
Remarkably, the frequencies and amplitudes of all the IMFs evolved over time and changed 
when moving from the first period (before Arab Spring) to the second period (before and after 
Arab Spring). As the frequency changes from high to low, the amplitudes of the IMFs become 
wider. We discuss three main frequency components: short-run (IMF1 and IMF2), medium-
run (IMF3and IMF4) and long-run (IMF5, IMF6 and IMF7). Table 1 presents the time scale 
interpretation of EMD. Since for the two considered periods, seven IMFs had been derived, 
the interpretation of frequency components is the same for the two investigated periods. 
 
Table 1. Interpretation of modes based on EMD 
Modes Mode-interpretation 
IMF1 Short-run: within one to two quarters 
IMF2 
IMF3 Medium-run: above two quarters and less than three years 
IMF4 
IMF5  
Long-run: above three years IMF6 
IMF7 
                                                 
9
 The EMD technique generates itself the modes depending to the data. For more details about data extraction, 
please refer to Huang et al. (2003). 
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Table 2 reports some measures which are given to depict more accurately the derived 
IMFs: the mean period of each IMF, the correlation between each IMF and the original data 
series and the variance percentage of each IMF. The mean period corresponds to the value 
obtained by dividing the total number of points by the number of peaks for each IMF. Pearson 
correlation and Kendall rank correlation coefficients help to determine the correlations 
between the various IMFs and the original data. Because IMFs are intrinsically independent, 
it is possible to sum up the variances and employ the percentage of variance to measure the 
contribution of each IMF to the total volatility of the original data set.  
  In doing so, we obtain quite interesting findings. Before Arab Spring, the real per 
capita GDP growth was highly driven by short-term inner factors (IMFs 1-2). For the whole 
period, the contributions of trend and long-term hidden features (IMF 6) became stronger; 
likewise for remittances (IMFs 1-2-3 for the restricted period and IMF7 for the prolonged 
period) and consumption (IMFs 1-2-3 for the period before Arab Spring and IMFs 6-7 when 
accounting for the aftermath of Arab Spring). Unlike, gGDP, REM/GDP and CONS/GDP, 
INV/GDP was likely to be sensitive to short-term factors (IMFs1-2) for the two investigated 
periods. 
Table 2. IMFs features 
 Restricted period (1990:Q1-2010:Q4) Whole period (1990:Q1-2015:Q3) 
 Mean 
period 
Pearson 
correlation 
Kendall 
correlation 
variance as % 
of the sum of 
(IMFs+residue) 
Mean 
period 
Pearson 
correlation 
Kendall 
correlation 
variance as % 
of the sum of 
(IMFs+residue) 
gGDP 
IMF1 1.33 0.496*** 0.433* 33.22% 1.86 0.059 0.052* 1.16% 
IMF2 1.42 0.285* 0.197** 24.08% 36.72 0.312*** 0.258** 16.17% 
IMF3 4.79 0.104** 0.098* 2.51% 8.15 0.132* 0.117** 4.76% 
IMF4 6.49 0.169* 0.110** 8.03% 5.38 0.099** 0.043 3.81% 
IMF5 9.57 0.095 0.087 0.98% 2.04 0.062 0.038 1.78% 
IMF6 13.58 0.088 0.071 1.57% 39.14 0.456** 0.414* 41.56% 
IMF7 18.19 0.103* 0.095 3.87% 12.23 0.113*** 0.101* 3.13% 
Residue  0.414** 0.376** 25.69%  0.324** 0.289* 32.67% 
REM/GDP 
IMF1 5.00 0.421** 0.309*** 25.61% 1.56 0.105*** 0.101* 1.849% 
IMF2 8.12 0.376** 0.256*** 13.42% 2.38 0.212*** 0.196** 18.13% 
IMF3 16.77 0.165*** 0.154** 12.50% 3.17 0.295*** 0.288*** 6.45% 
IMF4 22.49 0.505** 0.461* 8.12% 4.95 0.183** 0.172* 8.95% 
IMF5 23.86 0.484* 0.083 3.11% 5.78 0.109* 0.100** 2.732% 
IMF6 24.74 0.075* 0.052 2.27% 7.45 0.108*** 0.097** 1.611% 
IMF7 26.63 0.132** 0.096*** 1.91% 11.69 0.404** 0.387** 24.87% 
Residue  0.410*** 0.393*** 13.03%  0.269** 0.261*** 22.34% 
INV/GDP 
IMF1 1.87 0.492*** 0.445** 32.00% 18.79 0.322*** 0.300** 3.13% 
IMF2 7.46 0.397* 0.361** 28.73% 20.24 0.292* 0.175** 38.67% 
IMF3 8.53 0.158* 0.143** 15.89% 26.12 0.101** 0.069** 39.19% 
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IMF4 10.29 0.098 0.065 1.43% 9.08 0.123*** 0.119** 1.52% 
IMF5 11.37 0.124* 0.115** 1.15% 13.72 0.162** 0.135*** 1.93% 
IMF6 16.85 0.092* 0.088* 1.26% 6.56 0.114* 0.097* 0.95% 
IMF7 24.56 0.054 0.039 2.84% 14.15 0.095* 0.076** 1.05% 
Residue  0.102 0.084 3.09%  0.303* 0.281* 18.51% 
CONS/GDP 
IMF1 3.29 0.333** 0.328*** 35.16% 4.21 0.112 0.099 0.68% 
IMF2 5.88 0.197** 0.169* 18.42% 5.16 0.109** 0.076 0.56% 
IMF3 8.17 0.168*** 0.154*** 16.12% 6.10 0.086 0.054 0.12% 
IMF4 10.46 0.117* 0.103 6.05% 8.93 0.131** 0.116** 7.14% 
IMF5 10.93 0.068 0.045 0.78% 15.34 0.195*** 0.167*** 9.23% 
IMF6 11.76 0.104 0.092* 2.08% 16.47 0.262*** 0.199** 30.97% 
IMF7 12.54 0.044 0.036 0.28% 19.58 0.203*** 0.197* 22.03% 
Residue  0.172** 0.168*** 16.68%  0.256* 0.234** 28.15% 
Notes: ***, ** and *: Correlations are significant at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively (2-tailed). 
 
The findings reported in Table 3 give more precise information about the three main 
mono-components (short- and long-term factors) determining growth, remittances, 
investment, consumption and real effective exchange rate, and sustain the aforementioned 
outcomes displayed in Table 2. We find that the contributors of the variation of the variables 
of interest change by moving from the restricted to the whole period, with the exception of 
INV/GDP. The latter is still driven by high fluctuating components during the two 
investigated periods. For the rest of variables, the quickly fluctuating oscillations seem the 
major driving factors in the restricted period, while the long-term factors determine their 
variations when considering the onset of Arab Spring (i.e., the whole period). However, the 
investment to GDP appears driven by high frequency component for the two periods. 
Table 3. Correlations and variance of components 
 Restricted period (1990:Q1-2010:Q4) Whole period (1990:Q1-2015:Q3) 
 Pearson 
correlation 
Kendall 
correlation 
variance as % of 
the sum of WDFs  
Pearson 
correlation 
Kendall 
correlation 
variance as % of 
the sum of WDFs  
gGDP 
High frequency component 0.325* 0.318** 57.96% 0.113*** 0.077 6.89% 
Low Frequency component 0.279*** 0.256*** 5.72% 0.398** 0.367** 59.11% 
Trend component 0.108* 0.102** 25.69% 0.313** 0.300* 32.67% 
REM/GDP 
High frequency component 0.412* 0.373** 45.62% 0.217** 0.181*** 11.08% 
Low Frequency component 0.169* 0.123* 12.14% 0.455*** 0.424** 49.92% 
Trend component 0.357*** 0.329*** 23.03% 0.398** 0.372*** 22.34% 
INV/GDP 
High frequency component 0.467** 0.389* 51.23% 0.523** 0.510*** 63.04% 
Low Frequency component 0.081 0.064 8.45% 0.131* 0.092 4.12% 
Trend component 0.329*** 0.296** 13.09% 0.267* 0.195* 18.51% 
CONS/GDP 
High frequency component 0.481** 0.295* 48.78% 0.123** 0.110*** 10.98 
Low Frequency component 0.116* 0.100* 11.21% 0.411*** 0.372*** 46.72% 
Trend component 0.398*** 0.354** 16.68% 0.267* 0.195* 28.15% 
Notes: ***, ** and *: Correlations are significant at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively (2-tailed). 
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Figure 6 indicates that each component explaining the evolution of gGDP, REM/GDP, 
INV/GDP and CONS/GDP exhibits dissimilar characteristics. Consistently with the 
aforementioned outcomes, for the restricted period (left side graph) economic growth, 
remittances and consumption  appeared driven by high frequency components, while they 
seemed determined by low frequency component over the whole period (right side graph). 
Nevertheless, for the two periods under study, investment was determined by short-run 
features. 
Despite the meaningfulness of the above results, it is important to determine whether 
there exist hidden factors driving the relationships between remittances and macroeconomic 
variables (i.e., growth, investment and consumption) rather than identifying what drive the 
time series separately. So, our main purposes are (1) to assess whether the relationship 
between remittances and these macroeconomic variables is time-varying, and (2) to examine 
whether the effect of remittances on Tunisia’s growth may differ from the period prior to 
Arab Spring to the period post-2011 uprisings, and from one scale to another. To this end, we 
use a scale-on-scale correlation analysis while addressing the endogeneity problem.  
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Figure 6. The hidden characteristics of the variables of interest 
Restricted period (1990:Q1-2010:Q4) Whole period (1990:Q1-2015:Q3) 
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5.2. A   correlation  analysis-based EMD 
We use an OLS-based EMD to assess the dynamic dependencies among remittances 
flows and macroeconomic variables in unstable context.  Our procedure consists of regressing 
remittances on gGDP, INV/GDP and CONS/GDPeven if we account for potential control 
variables in both time domain (i.e., whole period) and among different time scales. This 
exercise aims at having a case of benchmarking to compare the time domain analysis with the 
multi-scale investigation.    
 
5.2.1. Remittances and growth 
Table 4 summarizes the estimates related to the relationship between remittances and 
economic growth for time domain and across different time scales.  Based on the time-domain 
analysis, we note that the remittances have no significant influence on economic growth over 
the restricted period (i.e. before the onset of the Arab Spring), while the effect appears 
significant and weaker when accounting for the post Arab Spring period (i.e., whole period). 
Dissimilar results are found when conducting a multi-scale analysis, highlighting that the 
relationship between remittance flows and growth is time-varying. In particular, the 
relationship is negative, weak and occurred in the medium-run (IMFs 3-4) during the 
restricted period. However, for the whole period (before and after the Arab Spring), 
remittances exert a positive and significant impact on Tunisia’s growth; such relationship is 
dominantly driven by long-term hidden factors (IMFs 5-7). It is true that remittance flows 
have never been considered as a strategic variable in the Tunisian economic policy. When 
comparing Tunisia to Morocco, the strategic path towards migration and remittances seems 
totally opposed. Unlike Tunisia, Morocco has conducted an “aggressive” policy aimed at 
attracting remittances via the establishment of organizations dedicated to migration (such as 
Ministry in Charge of Moroccans living abroad, Council for the Moroccan Communities 
abroad, etc.). It is important to mention that the economic situation of both countries is 
radically different. Before the Arab Spring, Tunisia witnessed a stable economic and political 
conditions and strong growth. Foreign investors tended to settle easily. The openness policy 
has played a vital role in boosting the development of a solid and innovative manufacturing 
industry. This is why, Tunisia was the “champion” compared to the rest of the MENA region 
and a “good student” according to World Bank and IMF criteria. However, this opulence 
masked the existing reality of corruption and inequalities that have played a great role in the 
popular uprising which actually aggravated the socioeconomic situation that motivated it. 
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Morocco, for its part, was characterized by a stable political situation, a great resilience in 
dealing with external shocks (2008 economic crisis and Arab Spring in particular), but its 
growth is volatile due to its rain-fed agriculture. Our results support that remittance inflows to 
Tunisia can be served as a countercyclical stabilizer and a shock-absorber. They show that 
before the Arab Spring, remittances had a negative and medium-run (IMF4) influence on 
growth, whereas its effect in the whole period was positive and determined by long-term 
factors (IMFs5-7).   
 
Table 4. Regression of economic growth on remittances 
 Time domain IMF1 IMF2 IMF3 IMF4 IMF5 IMF6 IMF7 
 Restricted period (1990:Q1-2010:Q4) 
C 4.5521** 
(2.689) 
5.328** 
(2.976) 
5.134*** 
(4.268) 
5.179*** 
(3.768) 
5.092** 
(2.915) 
5.137*** 
(4.118) 
5.634*** 
(4.348) 
5.553*** 
(4.492) 
REM/GDP 0.1157 
(1.575) 
0.0389 
(1.542) 
0.1234 
(1.376) 
-0.0161* 
(-1.863) 
-0.0258* 
(-1.779) 
-0.0251** 
(-2.359) 
0.0682 
(1.158) 
0.0689 
(1.109) 
FDI/GDP 0.0718* 
(1.862) 
0.0629** 
(2.698) 
0.0914* 
(1.976) 
-0.0124 
(-1.356) 
0.0393* 
(1.791) 
0.0697** 
(2.638) 
0.0332* 
(1.719) 
0.0617* 
(1.935) 
INV/GDP 0.0389** 
(2.671) 
0.1255 
(1.469) 
0.1345 
(1.387) 
0.0562** 
(2.943) 
0.1002* 
(0.079) 
0.0411** 
(3.017) 
0.0876* 
(1.923) 
0.1157** 
(2.814) 
OPEN 0.1145*** 
(3.815) 
0.0651 
(0.589) 
0.145*** 
(3.542) 
0.0134 
(1.156) 
-0.0188 
(0.706) 
0.0098** 
(2.923) 
0.0410 
(1.067) 
0.0367 
(1.156) 
Credits/GDP 0.0924* 
(1.723) 
0.1155* 
(1.914) 
0.1094** 
(2.619) 
0.1561 
(0.956) 
-0.1345 
(-0.546) 
-0.2671 
(-1.423) 
-0.532 
(-1.493) 
0.2619 
(1.433) 
REER -0.1568** 
(-2.492) 
-0.098** 
(-2.517) 
-0.0862** 
(-2.678) 
-0.193*** 
(-4.562) 
-0.1724* 
(-1.854) 
-0.146*** 
(-3.617) 
-0.208** 
(-2.775) 
-0.2095** 
(-2.813) 
R2 0.85 0.84 0.88 0.86 0.88 0.89 0.86 0.88 
 Whole period (1990:Q1-2015:Q3) 
C 3.892*** 
(3.759) 
4.892*** 
(5.168) 
4.689*** 
(4.689) 
4.159** 
(3.029) 
4.356** 
(3.145) 
5.102*** 
(3.924) 
4.814*** 
(4.189) 
4.415*** 
(3.624) 
REM/GDP 0.0054* 
(3.589) 
0.0135 
(1.673) 
0.0324 
(1.649) 
0.0145 
(1.427) 
0.0357 
(1.126) 
0.0452** 
(2.789) 
0.0877*** 
(3.524) 
0.1095* 
(1.823) 
FDI/GDP 0.0913* 
(2.014) 
0.0675** 
(2.435) 
0.0532 
(1.432) 
0.0372 
(1.542) 
0.045 
(1.601) 
0.0479 
(1.134) 
0.0572** 
(2.517) 
0.0652** 
(2.617) 
INV/GDP 0.0135** 
(2.518) 
0.0102 
(1.459) 
0.0562 
(1.398) 
0.0113 
(1.3185) 
0.055** 
(2.567) 
0.0276 
(1.792) 
0.0478** 
(2.610) 
0.0697* 
(1.886) 
OPEN 0.1052*** 
(3.710) 
0.068*** 
(4.563) 
0.0912** 
(2.651) 
0.0625*** 
(4.298) 
0.084*** 
(3.498) 
0.136** 
(2.594) 
0.1345*** 
(4.126) 
0.0965** 
(2.345) 
Credits/GDP 0.0641* 
(1.865) 
0.0723* 
(1.875) 
0.0542** 
(2.921) 
0.0651* 
(1.932) 
0.0489* 
(1.932) 
0.0469** 
(2.765) 
0.0345* 
(1.699) 
0.0452** 
(2.610) 
REER -0.134*** 
(-3.772) 
-0.197** 
(-2.514) 
-0.267** 
(-2.498) 
-0.2452*** 
(-4.092) 
-0.189* 
(-1.796) 
-0.072 
(-1.605) 
-0.078** 
(-2.501) 
-0.065** 
(-2.708) 
R2 0.86 0.88 0.85 0.87 0.84 0.87 0.88 0.84 
Notes: ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
Further, during the period prior to the Arab Spring, the FDI had a positive and 
significant impact on growth among different time horizons. Foreign investors were highly 
attracted by the political stability and the high growth. However, during the uncertainty 
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surrounding Tunisia in the onset of Arab Spring, FDI’s impact on gGDP became very 
volatile; it was likely to be negative and positive depending to IMFs variation, but what 
appears meaningful is that the FDI effects fell considerably by moving from the restricted to 
the whole period. This outcome may be explained by the deterioration of Tunisian security 
situation and the lack of medium and long-term economic visibility.  
 
Our previous results indicate that remittances help to promote economic growth during 
turbulent times. It remains to address whether remittances are spent on consumption, or 
channelled into productive investment. To this purpose, we regress investment and 
consumption on remittances and other relevant control variables. 
 
5.2.2. The uses of remittances: productive investment vs. consumption 
A further step consists on analyzing the relationship between (1) remittances and 
domestic investment to GDP, and (2) remittance inflows and consumption to GDP. The time 
domain and scale-on-scale results of the regression of investment on remittances are 
summarized in Table 5.   
 
Table 5. Regression of investment on remittances  
 Time 
domain 
IMF1 IMF2 IMF3 IMF4 IMF5 IMF6 IMF7 
 Restricted period (1990:Q1-2010:Q4) 
C 2.4561** 
(2.651) 
1.9203 
(1.122) 
1.3803 
(1.327) 
1.8219 
(1.266) 
2.0042 
(1.523) 
3.655*** 
(3.254) 
4.325*** 
(3.645) 
1.8023** 
(2.895) 
REM/GDP -0.0345* 
(1.692) 
-0.0763* 
(-1.812) 
-0.0807* 
(-1.942) 
-0.0621* 
(-1.734) 
0.0187 
(0.121) 
0.0210 
(0.112) 
0.0200 
(1.161) 
0.5723 
(0.408) 
FDI/GDP -0.0167** 
(-2.501) 
0.0353 
(0.597) 
-0.0550* 
(-1.841) 
-0.0759* 
(-1.871) 
0.0138 
(0.440) 
0.0833 
(0.654) 
-0.016*** 
(-3.176) 
-0.027** 
(-2.358) 
gGDP 0.0245*** 
(3.659) 
0.0134 
(0.703) 
-0.0106 
(0.801) 
-0.0073 
(0.870) 
0.0093 
(0.553) 
-0.0201 
(0.736) 
0.0183 
(1.297) 
0.0363* 
(1.761) 
OPEN 0.06239* 
(1.876) 
0.0932 
(1.213) 
0.0763** 
(2.451) 
0.0764* 
(1.893) 
0.4321 
(1.279) 
0.0679* 
(1.843) 
0.1389 
(1.267) 
0.1056** 
(2.418) 
Credits/GDP 0.0196* 
(1.838) 
0.3167 
(1.512) 
0.1982 
(1.367) 
0.0113* 
(1.768) 
0.0345** 
(2.456) 
0.0452** 
(2.138) 
0.0512* 
(1.913) 
0.1567 
(1.083) 
CPI -0.093*** 
(-3.404) 
-0.1698** 
(-2.595) 
-0.1690** 
(-2.552) 
-0.1777** 
(-2.689) 
-0.1118* 
(-1.729) 
0.1393* 
(1.912) 
0.0048 
(0.873) 
-0.0194 
(0.512) 
RIR -0.1934** 
(-2.671) 
-0.211*** 
(-4.231) 
-0.222*** 
(-3.761) 
-0.220*** 
(-3.6251) 
-0.217*** 
(-4.118) 
-0.195*** 
(-3.672) 
-0.061*** 
(-4.110) 
-0.05*** 
(-3.819) 
R2 0.79 0.89 0.87 0.84 0.80 0.75 0.92 0.95 
 Whole period (1990:Q1-2015:Q3) 
C 6.8729** 
(2.597) 
7.5233*** 
(3.562) 
7.6826** 
(2.675) 
8.3058* 
(1.672) 
8.6777*** 
(3.845) 
8.6513*** 
(3.345) 
1.5678 
(1.004) 
7.5233* 
(1.976) 
REM/GDP 0.0862 
(1.542) 
-0.452 
(-1.328) 
-0.123** 
(-2.514) 
0.2816 
(0.252) 
-0.1377 
(-0.839) 
0.0184 
(1.037) 
-0.0070 
(-0.982) 
0.2815 
(0.276) 
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FDI/GDP -0.0324* 
(-1.810) 
0.0165 
(0.015) 
-0.0321* 
(-1.834) 
0.0432* 
(-1.697) 
-0.0020 
(-0.730) 
-0.0125 
(-0.170) 
-0.0106 
(-0.318) 
-0.0165* 
(-2.132) 
gGDP 0.0453* 
(1.769) 
0.0421 
(0.275) 
-0.0120 
(0.192) 
0.0096 
(0.184) 
0.0074 
(0.372) 
0.0881** 
(2.545) 
0.0686*** 
(2.632) 
0.1345 
(1.307) 
OPEN 0.1042** 
(2.610) 
0.1084* 
(1.884) 
0.0452*** 
(3.551) 
0.0333*** 
(4.162) 
0.0371*** 
(3.742) 
0.1097* 
(1.941) 
0.0817* 
(1.876) 
0.1084 
(1.221) 
Credits/GDP 0.0432** 
(2.619) 
0.0568* 
(1.899) 
0.4135 
(0.522) 
0.0755* 
(2.066) 
-0.0658 
(-0.920) 
-0.0612 
(-0.931) 
0.0157** 
(3.008) 
0.1414 
(0.752) 
CPI -0.0368** 
(-2.491) 
-0.0216* 
(-2.093) 
0.0258 
(0.273) 
-0.0130 
(-0.528) 
-0.0030 
(0.898) 
-0.0251* 
(-1.876) 
0.0194 
(0.532) 
-0.0216 
(-1.133) 
RIR -0.032*** 
(-3.425) 
-0.0121* 
(-1.698) 
-0.0370 
(-0.213) 
-0.0183* 
(-2.083) 
-0.0023 
(-0.934) 
-0.0070 
(-0.807) 
-0.1223* 
(-1.765) 
-0.0121* 
(-1.945) 
R2 0.91 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.91 0.85 0.95 
Notes: ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
 
From the time domain analysis, we note that remittances exert a negative influence on 
investment prior to the Arab Spring, and insignificant effect when accounting for the period 
after 2011 uprisings. From the multi-scale investigation, different outcomes were gathered: 
For the two periods under study, the linkage between REM/GDP and INV/GDP seemed to be 
driven by short-term factors (IMFs1-3). In terms of the sign of the remittances’ coefficient, 
we note some changes by moving from the restricted to the lengthy period. Before the Arab 
Spring, the remittances effect on investment to GDP was variant (negative for IMF2 and 
IMF3, and positive for IMF1), while its influence was statistically negative and significant 
(IMF2) when considering the whole period (prior to and post Arab Spring). These findings 
suggest that Tunisians living abroad send their money to support their families and not for 
investment opportunities. These findings also underscore the usefulness of correlation 
analysis-based EMD when assessing remittances-investment nexus. 
Table 6 reports the time domain and the multi-scale correlation outcomes of the 
regression of consumption on remittance inflows. All the findings go in the same direction 
that remittances have a positive impact on consumption either for the restricted or the 
prolonged period; But the correlation results derived from EMD appear more fine as we can 
see when exactly the relation in question is positive and when it is insignificant. Specifically, 
a positive link between the focal variables was found in short-run (IMFs1-2) over the period 
before the aftermath of Arab Spring. However, by considering the post Arab Spring period, 
we show that the impact of remittances on consumption became positive and more 
pronounced (i.e., driven by long-term inner features: IMFs6-7).  Potentially, a sharp 
complementarity among the cycles remittances-growth and remittances-consumption was 
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shown, sustaining the evidence remittances to Tunisia had mostly been spent for excessive 
consumption rather than the improvement of national investment.  
 
Table 6. Regression of consumption on remittances  
 Time domain IMF1 IMF2 IMF3 IMF4 IMF5 IMF6 IMF7 
  Restricted period (1990:Q1-2010:Q4) 
C 4.521** 
(2.814) 
4.458*** 
(3.456) 
4.430*** 
(4.115) 
4.422*** 
(3.629) 
4.563*** 
(3.515) 
4.5801** 
(2.764) 
4.545** 
(1.986) 
4.467*** 
(3.197) 
REM/GDP 0.043* 
(1.892) 
0.086* 
(1.823) 
0.089* 
(1.802) 
0.0035 
(0.661) 
0.0130 
(0.602) 
-0.0044 
(0.772) 
0.022 
(0.697) 
0.024 
(0.661) 
Credits/GDP 0.134* 
(1.715) 
0.168*** 
(3.245) 
0.1525** 
(2.671) 
0.1475* 
(1.796) 
0.0972* 
(2.043) 
0.0450 
(0.436) 
-0.049 
(-0.368) 
0.046 
(0.228) 
gGDP 
 
0.031** 
(2.671) 
0.020* 
(1.979) 
0.0345 
(0.448) 
0.0353 
(0.445) 
0.0174* 
(2.101) 
0.0286 
(0.607) 
0.052 
(1.267) 
0.067 
(0.226) 
CPI -0.196** 
(-2.871) 
-0.27*** 
(-3.149) 
-0.261*** 
(-4.005) 
-0.25*** 
(-3.814) 
-0.243** 
(-2.976) 
-0.21*** 
(-4.116) 
-0.1*** 
(-3.812) 
-0.213** 
(-2.689) 
RIR -0.062* 
(-1.967) 
-0.045 
(-1.531) 
-0.0370** 
(-2.678) 
-0.0329* 
(-1.985) 
-0.0121 
(-0.459) 
-0.0068 
(-0.691) 
-0.005 
(-0.710) 
-0.005* 
(-2.038) 
R2 0.86 0.90 0.86 0.84 0.83 0.87 0.83 0.79 
   Whole period (1990:Q1-2015:Q3) 
C 4.169*** 
(3.841) 
4.469*** 
(4.576) 
3.907*** 
(3.763) 
3.979*** 
(3.986) 
1.616 
(1.156) 
11.83** 
(2.561) 
1.429 
(1.514) 
6.283*** 
(3.612) 
REM/GDP 0.050** 
(2.687) 
0.034 
(0.321) 
0.0310 
(1.001) 
0.0806 
(0.399) 
0.0226 
(0.273) 
0.0635 
(0.340) 
0.097* 
(1.876) 
0.115* 
(2.834) 
Credits/GDP 0.095 
(1.115) 
0.122* 
(1.916) 
0.1573 
(0.004) 
0.1095* 
(1.928) 
0.0339 
(0.162) 
0.0211 
(0.274) 
0.007 
(0.653) 
0.334 
(0.515) 
gGDP 0.041* 
(1.705) 
0.022** 
(2.397) 
0.0504* 
(1.886) 
0.8952 
(0.450) 
0.3240 
(0.210) 
0.0261 
(0.117) 
0.018 
(0.228) 
0.122 
(0.786) 
CPI -0.076** 
(-2.631) 
-0.200 
(-0.963) 
-0.109*** 
(-3.658) 
0.5006 
(0.260) 
-0.0239 
(0.425) 
-0.0135 
(0.570) 
-0.004 
(0.840) 
-0.183** 
(-2.356) 
RIR 
 
-0.071** 
(-1.642) 
-0.056* 
(-1.765) 
-0.068*** 
(-3.914) 
-0.0568 
(-1.119) 
-0.08*** 
(-4.112) 
-0.072** 
(-2.334) 
-0.105* 
(-1.921) 
0.141 
(-1.196) 
R2 0.89 0.91 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.86 0.92 0.90 
Notes: ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
 
6.      Robustness  
There exist different ways to ascertain whether our results are fairly solid. Throughout the 
rest of our study, we specify two set of robustness check. First, we control for possible 
endogeneity bias via 2SLS-based EMD. Second, for the majority of studies on the 
relationship between remittances and economic development, the main question to be 
answered is framed around whether remittances are a statistically significant factor in 
boosting economic development. Another quite interesting question in relation to remittances 
and economic development should be that of causation. Such a question asks whether 
remittance flows cause economic development or visa-versa. So, because correlation does not 
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imply causation, another focus of this study is to verify whether there exists a cyclical causal 
relation between remittances and the focal macroeconomic variables (growth per capita, 
investment to GDP and consumption to GDP). For this purpose, we utilize a frequency 
domain causality test
10
. The frequency domain analysis offers an appropriate alternative tool 
by examining the causality in frequency domain, while standard causality tests focus only on 
the time domain. 
 
6.1. Endogeneity 
The endogeneity bias is one of the methodological challenges that confront research on 
international migration and remittances. This can occur if remittances are sent to home 
country for altruistic motives or if there is an increase in workers’ remittances coincided with 
a rise in migration from countries with low economic growth. A way to correct for the 
endogeneity biases is to carry out two-stage least squares (2SLS) or GMM using lag of the 
explanatory variables as instruments (see, for example, Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2009 and 
Barajas et al. 2009). In the current study, we apply a 2SLS-based EMD to re-analyze the 
dynamic dependency between remittances inflows and macroeconomic variables in an 
unstable context, while controlling for endogeneity problem. We summarize the 2SLS-based 
EMD findings of the regressions of growth, investment and consumption on remittances and 
further explanatory variables in Tables 7, 8 and 9 respectively. Our results robustly reveal that 
before the onset of Arab Spring, remittances affected negatively the per capita economic 
growth and positively the consumption; such relationships held in the short- or the medium-
run.  However, we note a time-varying impact of these financial flows on domestic 
investment; it was negative in some IMFs (IMF2) and positive in others (IMF1), but it was 
likely to be significant only in the short-term. By accounting for the post-Arab Spring period, 
the investment effect of remittance inflows became weaker and determined by short- and 
medium-term factors, while a positive, strong and long-run remittances’ effects on growth and 
consumption were found. Moreover, our findings also unambiguously show that either 
considering the restricted or the whole period, an increase in remittances is significantly 
linked to an appreciation of real effective exchange rate; such relationship is validated at 
longer time horizons. These outcomes seem consistent with the findings derived from the 
                                                 
10
 While EMD is performed within a discrete time framework, the frequency domain causality has a spectral 
content across a continuous range.
 
The frequency domain causality test provides clearer cycle information almost 
in real time, while business cycles cannot be identified before a cycle has been completed. 
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OLS-based EMD, and confirm the effectiveness of the scale-on-scale correlation analysis 
compared to the time domain assessment
11
 (Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7). 
 
Table 8. Regression of economic growth on remittances (Control for endogeneity) 
 Time domain IMF1 IMF2 IMF3 IMF4 IMF5 IMF6 IMF7 
 Restricted period (1990:Q1-2010:Q4) 
C -3.6942* 
(-1.699) 
-4.894 
(-1.324) 
-6.488 
(-1.474) 
-8.207 
(-1.532) 
-6.752 
(-1.347) 
-3.553 
(-0.753) 
-2.086 
(-0.493) 
-5.346 
(-1.236) 
REM/GDP -0.0034* 
(-1.782) 
-0.020 
(-1.214) 
-0.012 
(-0.724) 
0.007 
(0.362) 
-0.019** 
(-2.316) 
-0.014 
(-0.220) 
0.067 
(0.654) 
-0.009 
(-0.359) 
FDI/GDP 0.0051* 
(1.812) 
0.004*** 
(4.267) 
0.024 
(0.341) 
0.031** 
(2.990) 
0.003** 
(2.201) 
0.010*** 
(5.498) 
0.003*** 
(4.380) 
0.002*** 
(4.138) 
INV/GDP 0.1018* 
(1.7054) 
-0.141 
(-1.504) 
0.203* 
(1.698) 
0.028** 
(-2.505) 
0.131 
(0.524) 
0.054** 
(2.789) 
0.110* 
(1.758) 
-0.005 
(-0.203) 
OPEN 0.0962** 
(2.506) 
-0.009 
(-0.185) 
0.293*** 
(4.053) 
-0.019 
(-0.604) 
0.122 
(1.680) 
0.115* 
(1.813) 
0.125* 
(1.722) 
0.116* 
(1.806) 
Credits/GDP 0.1168 
(1.005) 
0.041 
(0.588) 
0.167 
(1.225) 
-0.022 
(-0.680) 
-0.046 
(-0.511) 
0.136 
(0.404) 
0.076 
(0.534) 
0.113 
(0.814) 
REER -0.2273* 
(-1.794) 
0.244 
(0.962) 
0.132 
(0.320) 
0.098 
(0.472) 
0.241 
(1.084) 
0.004 
(0.012) 
-0.369* 
(-1.903) 
-0.252** 
(2.593) 
Cragg-Donald 
F-statistic 
36.29 32.17 34.49 41.05 36.78 24.21 30.16 29.48 
 Whole period (1990:Q1-2015:Q3) 
C -3.2569 
(-1.389) 
-1.796 
(-0.756) 
1.144 
(0.157) 
-27.759 
(-0.819) 
-17.953 
(-0.753) 
-48.916 
(-0.370) 
-13.690 
(-0.462) 
15.511 
(0.279) 
REM/GDP 0.0192* 
(1.832) 
0.027 
(0.105) 
0.456 
(0.266) 
0.273 
(0.568) 
0.223 
(0.343) 
0.050* 
(1.739) 
0.035** 
(2.525) 
0.127*** 
(3.433) 
FDI/GDP -0.0772** 
(-2.694) 
-0.067* 
(-1.789) 
-0.569 
(-1.125) 
-0.215 
(-1.176) 
-0.114* 
(-1.897) 
-0.09*** 
(-3.742) 
0.011*** 
(4.292) 
-0.098 
(-1.954) 
INV/GDP 0.0298* 
(1.794) 
0.010 
(0.835) 
1.129 
(1.186) 
0.082* 
(1.911) 
0.076** 
(2.589) 
0.023 
(1.414) 
0.067 
(0.925) 
0.061* 
(1.911) 
OPEN 0.0892** 
(2.567) 
0.097** 
(2.546) 
0.102* 
(1.956) 
0.089*** 
(3.972) 
0.115** 
(2.756) 
0.114*** 
(2.913) 
0.098** 
(2.765) 
0.038* 
(1.816) 
Credits/GDP 0.0342* 
(1.801) 
0.021* 
(1.713) 
0.010 
(1.365) 
0.031*** 
(3.009) 
0.045** 
(2.879) 
0.026*** 
(5.139) 
0.047 
(1.251) 
0.035*** 
(3.818) 
REER -0.1945*** 
(-3.189) 
-0.081** 
(-2.695) 
-0.123 
(-0.657) 
-0.045* 
(-1.923) 
-0.606 
(-0.865) 
-0.168 
(-0.924) 
-0.362 
(-1.415) 
-0.285 
(-0.717) 
Cragg-Donald 
F-statistic 
34.89 36.21 31.67 31.72 34.07 25.28 32.18 30.89 
Notes: ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 10% and 15% critical value of 
Stock–Yogo weak idetification test are 17.02 and 13.85, respectively; The null hypothesis of weak instruments 
or Cragg–Donald F-statistic test can be rejected when the associated F-statistic values appear stronger than the 
critical values by thresholds provided by Stock and Yogo (2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 Instead of using time domain analysis allowing to analyze the relationship between remittances and 
macroeconomic variables throughout the entire period, the correlation analysis-based EMD permits to see how 
behave the investigated linkage across various time-scales.    
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Table 9. Regression of investment on remittances (Control for endogeneity) 
 Time 
domain 
IMF1 IMF2 IMF3 IMF4 IMF5 IMF6 IMF7 
 Restricted period (1990:Q1-2010:Q4) 
C -6.542** 
(-2.345) 
-9.321* 
(-1.894) 
-8.324 
(-1.234) 
-6.7*** 
(-7.234) 
-6.739*** 
(-3.513) 
-7.459* 
(-1.867) 
-7.212** 
(-2.852) 
-6.542*** 
(-4.510) 
REM/GDP -0.039** 
(-2.632) 
0.062* 
(1.796) 
-0.134*** 
(-3.865) 
-0.074* 
(-1.891) 
0.146 
(0.975) 
0.102 
(1.136) 
0.056 
(1.189) 
0.105 
(1.128) 
FDI/GDP -0.009** 
(-2.684) 
-0.061 
(-1.238) 
0.073 
(1.234) 
-0.303 
(-1.278) 
-1.006 
(-1.135) 
-0.07*** 
(-3.291) 
-0.06*** 
(-4.011) 
-0.083** 
(-2.612) 
gGDP 0.369 
(1.045) 
0.819 
(0.227) 
-0.256 
(-1.616) 
0.274 
(0.812) 
0.139 
(1.000) 
0.124 
(1.514) 
0.436 
(1.048) 
0.185 
(1.313) 
OPEN 0.107* 
(1.863) 
0.079 
(1.426) 
0.081* 
(1.891) 
0.164 
(1.424) 
0.210 
(1.358) 
0.131 
(1.976) 
0.146** 
(2.525) 
0.137* 
(1.924) 
Credits/GDP 0.035* 
(1.942) 
-0.151 
(-1.303) 
-0.167 
(-1.411) 
0.129 
(1.101) 
0.472 
(0.869) 
0.031* 
(1.756) 
0.026*** 
(4.158) 
0.022*** 
(3.194) 
CPI -0.168* 
(-1.875) 
-0.135* 
(-1.912) 
-0.678 
(-1.193) 
-0.105 
(-1.247) 
-0.367 
(-1.235) 
-0.225* 
(-1.834) 
-0.171* 
(-1.912) 
-0.215** 
(-2.472) 
RIR -0.094** 
(-2.352) 
-0.178* 
(-1.796) 
-0.092 
(-1.414) 
-0.076* 
(-1.543) 
-0.023* 
(-1.703) 
-0.129 
(-0.738) 
-0.182 
(-0.503) 
-0.045** 
(-1.615) 
Cragg-Donald 
F-statistic 
26.79 25.67 26.71 26.72 28.32 28.01 28.00 29.12 
 Whole period (1990:Q1-2015:Q3) 
C -4.503** 
(-2.689) 
-3.792*** 
(-4.525) 
-4.123** 
(-2.525) 
-4.58*** 
(-4.515) 
-4.096** 
(-2.323) 
-4.100* 
(-1.891) 
-4.196** 
(-2.613) 
-4.811** 
(-2.356) 
REM/GDP -0.129 
(-1.639) 
-0.145* 
(-1.909) 
-0.136* 
(-1.811) 
0.063 
(1.286) 
0.045 
(0.678) 
0.021 
(0.616) 
0.356 
 (1.325) 
0.142 
(0.796) 
FDI/GDP -0.061** 
(-2.342) 
-0.156 
(-1.103) 
0.368 
(0.511) 
-0.245 
(-1.567) 
-0.358 
(-1.034) 
-0.062 
(-1.245) 
-0.08*** 
(-3.629) 
-0.056* 
(-1.869) 
gGDP 0.067*** 
(3.109) 
-0.621 
(-0.855) 
0.421 
(1.236) 
0.094** 
(2.678) 
0.156 
(1.245) 
0.092* 
(1.956) 
0.088* 
(1.875) 
0.122 
(1.074) 
OPEN 0.051* 
(1.768) 
0.039* 
(1.892) 
0.098*** 
(3.819) 
0.164 
(1.424) 
0.167 
(1.023) 
0.234 
(1.126) 
0.065* 
(2.100) 
0.113 
(1.045) 
Credits/GDP 0.038* 
(1.910) 
-0.009 
(-1.134) 
0.076* 
(1.810) 
0.129 
(1.101) 
0.067 
(1.008) 
0.028*** 
(3.896) 
0.138 
(1.249) 
0.156 
(0.689) 
CPI -0.083** 
(-2.819) 
-0.095*** 
(-3.621) 
-0.096** 
(-2.553) 
-0.105 
(-1.247) 
0.135 
(0.921) 
-0.131 
(-1.424) 
-0.138 
(-1.256) 
-0.034* 
(-1.826) 
RIR -0.045** 
(-2.378) 
-0.038* 
(-1.864) 
-0.515 
(-1.123) 
-0.051* 
(-1.747) 
-0.312 
(-0.767) 
-0.085* 
(-1.698) 
0.096 
(-1.002) 
-0.005 
(-0.912) 
Cragg-Donald 
F-statistic 
24.56 23.15 29.07 26.15 28.14 21.87 22.13 25.67 
Notes: ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 10% and 15% critical value of 
Stock–Yogo weak idetification test are 17.02 and 13.85, respectively; The null hypothesis of weak instruments 
or Cragg–Donald F-statistic test can be rejected when the associated F-statistic values appear stronger than the 
critical values by thresholds provided by Stock and Yogo (2005). 
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Table 10. Regression of Consumption on remittances (Control for endogeneity) 
 Time domain IMF1 IMF2 IMF3 IMF4 IMF5 IMF6 IMF7 
  Restricted period (1990:Q1-2010:Q4) 
C 3.109*** 
(3.571) 
2.891*** 
(3.912) 
1.783* 
(1.881) 
2.672** 
(2.936) 
1.924*** 
(3.876) 
2.345*** 
(4.516) 
1.356** 
(1.972) 
1.642*** 
(3.514) 
REM/GDP 0.067** 
(2.871) 
0.103* 
(1.834) 
0.095** 
(2.717) 
0.114 
(1.639) 
0.167 
(1.056) 
0.279 
(0.832) 
0.313 
(1.042) 
0.129 
(1.361) 
Credits/GDP 0.068** 
(2.425) 
0.092 
(1.414) 
0.126*** 
(4.267) 
0.119*** 
(3.125) 
0.549 
(1.309) 
0.212 
(1.192) 
0.083* 
(1.914) 
0.215 
(1.318) 
gGDP 
 
0.029*** 
(3.814) 
0.023** 
(2.511) 
0.011* 
(1.912) 
0.014* 
(1.822) 
0.097* 
(2.064) 
0.017* 
(1.695) 
0.069 
(1.254) 
0.108* 
(1.935) 
CPI -0.181*** 
(-3.619) 
-0.214** 
(-2.356) 
-0.156** 
(-3.004) 
-0.194*** 
(-4.361) 
-0.167** 
(-1.982) 
-0.212*** 
(-4.918) 
-0.162* 
(-1.724) 
-0.171** 
(-2.526) 
RIR -0.037** 
(-2.618) 
-0.023 
(-1.414) 
-0.011* 
(-1.749) 
-0.049 
(-1.020) 
0.014 
(1.187) 
-0.044* 
(-1.781) 
-0.052* 
(-1.912) 
-0.021** 
(-2.814) 
Cragg-Donald 
F-statistic 
22.35 19.87 21.42 20.98 21.15 22.37 23.14 21.68 
   Whole period (1990:Q1-2015:Q3) 
C 3.892* 
(1.716) 
4.056 
(1.127) 
3.246 
(1.214) 
4.156*** 
(3.672) 
4.092** 
(2.627) 
4.156*** 
(3.492) 
3.565** 
(2.482) 
3.916*** 
(3.227) 
REM/GDP 
 
0.129* 
(1.876) 
0.062 
(1.378) 
0.131 
(0.907) 
0.114 
(1.316) 
0.110 
(1.458) 
0.098 
(1.945) 
0.135** 
(2.691) 
0.126*** 
(3.711) 
Credits/GDP 0.056*** 
(3.809) 
-0.01*** 
(-4.213) 
0.096 
(1.154) 
0.054 
(1.319) 
0.076 
(1.020) 
0.049 
(1.286) 
0.069*** 
(4.712) 
0.088* 
(1.972) 
gGDP 0.034** 
(2.573) 
0.021* 
(1.699) 
0.023** 
(2.167) 
0.076 
(1.434) 
0.100 
(0.928) 
0.094 
(1.518) 
0.045* 
(1.758) 
0.094** 
(2.076) 
CPI 
 
-0.186** 
(-2.714) 
-0.28*** 
(-4.312) 
-0.197** 
(-2.652) 
-0.234*** 
(-3.861) 
-0.256** 
(-2.489) 
-0.267* 
(-1.993) 
-0.245** 
(-2.417) 
-0.189* 
(-1.762) 
RIR 
 
-0.066*** 
(-3.298) 
-0.072* 
(-1.914) 
-0.096** 
(-2.527) 
-0.110** 
(-2.314) 
-0.08*** 
(-4.112) 
-0.072** 
(-2.334) 
-0.105* 
(-1.921) 
0.141 
(-1.196) 
Cragg-Donald 
F-statistic 
23.18 21.04 20.18 19.76 18.34 17.26 20.13 19.82 
Notes: ***, ** and * imply significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 10% and 15 % critical value of 
Stock–Yogo weak idetification test are 17.02 and 13.85, respectively; The null hypothesis of weak instruments 
or Cragg–Donald F-statistic test can be rejected when the associated F-statistic values appear stronger than the 
critical values by thresholds provided by Stock and Yogo (2005). 
 
6.2. The frequency domain causality results 
A further step for robustness check consists of employing frequency domain causality 
test
 
 
12
 to test whether there is a causal relationship between remittances and the focal 
macroeconomic variables from one frequency to another. The figure contains the test statistics 
with their 5 percent critical values for the frequency bands involved (solid line) over the 
interval [0, π]. The frequency  on the horizontal axis can be translated into a cycle or 
periodicity of T weeks by  where T is the period. Figure 7.1 describes the evolution of 
the causal relationship between growth and remittances depending to frequency 
                                                 
12
 For details about the procedure of this technique, you can refer to Overview A.1 (Appendices). 
)(
)/2( T
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transformations. Before the Arab Spring, we support a medium-run unidirectional causality 
from remittances to growth, especially when  corresponding to a cycle length 
between 2.4 and 4.5 quarters. However, a long-run causal relation running from remittances 
to growth happened when focusing on the whole period (before and after the Arab Spring), in 
particular when , corresponding to a cycle superior to 6.4 quarters. The 
reverse link is not validated at any frequency and at any estimation period.  
For the remittances impact on investment, a slight change was marked by moving 
from the restricted to the whole period (Figure 7.2). Prior to Arab Spring event, remittance 
inflows Granger-caused domestic investment in high frequencies (when   03.381.2  , in 
particular for a cycle less than 2.2 quarters). This relationship remained driven by quickly 
fluctuating components for the whole period. Nevertheless, the remittances’ impact on 
INV/GDP was stronger for the second period as the cycle expands to 2.7 quarters                           
(   03.327.2  ).  
As the cycle remittances-growth (Figure 6.1), a causal link running from remittances to 
consumption (Figure 7.3) was supported in the short-run for the restricted period (when
  03.370.2  ), corresponding to a cycle length inferior to 2.3 quarters) and in the long-
run for the whole period (when   54.001.0  ) corresponding to a cycle above 11.6 
quarters).  
Overall, the frequency domain causality findings seem consistent with the correlation 
analysis-based EMD. Specifically, the consideration of the Arab spring period in our 
estimates led to sharp changes in the cycles remittances-growth and remittances- 
consumption; the cycles which were valid in the short term for the restricted period, became 
explained by long-term oscillations for the whole period. This confirms the consistency of 
these two cycles. The cycle remittances-investment and remittances-real effective exchange 
rate changed too but moderately. However, the linkage between REM/GDP and INV/GDP 
remained driven by short-term factors for the two periods. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  60.230.1 
  98.001.0 
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Figure 7. The frequency domain causality between remittances and macroeconomic 
variables  
Restricted period (1990:Q1-2010:Q4) Whole period (1990:Q1-2015:Q3) 
7.1. REM/GDP and gGDP 
 
 
 
 
7.2.  REM/GDP and INV/GDP 
 
 
 
 
7.3. REM/GDP and CONS/GDP 
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7.         Conclusion and policy implications 
Before the downfall of Ben Ali’s regime, Tunisia has succeeded to have a prosperous 
economy but the country is destabilized by the Arab Spring that came to underscore the 
weakness of the pillars of its economy which had not withstood this shock. The tourism 
collapsed, FDI dried up, the foreign trade did not resist, and the dinar depreciated. Unusually, 
remittances survived and even rose, highlighting their countercyclical behavior. In light of 
this observation, this study attempts to determine the channels through which these financial 
inflows can help to boost economic growth in a country that saw extreme social and political 
turmoil. This article uses newly econometric techniques which contain several novel features 
that set this study apart from the literature on the issue. We use a multi-scale analysis based 
on Empirical Mode Decomposition. This method aims at disentangling each variable into 
different scaling components and at each scale estimating the correlation between the 
variables under study. These methods allow us to extract intrinsic features inherent to the time 
series. This is expected to yield more accurate and minute scrutiny which would estimate 
“complex” relationship between remittances and macroeconomic variables, i.e., economic 
growth, domestic investment and consumption in an unstable context. 
Because we have not enough observations to make estimation for the post-Arab spring 
period, we thought to consider (1) a restricted period: prior to the aftermath of Arab Spring 
and (2) a whole or extended period: before and after the onset of Arab Spring event. Despite 
this limitation, three relevant outcomes are drawn. First, although the remittances’ effect on 
growth is negative and dominantly determined by short-term inner factors in the restricted 
period, it becomes positive and driven by long-term factors in the extended period. Second, 
while in restricted period, the remittances’ impact on investment is likely to be variant 
(negative in some scales and positive in others) and explained by short-term inner features, in 
the extended period, this effect becomes negative, weak and driven by short- and medium-
term factors. Third, migrants’ remittances have a positive and significant effect on 
consumption in the two periods. But, this effect is held in the short-run in the restricted period 
and in the long-run in the whole period.  
These findings suggest that it is unnecessary to oppose the two transmission channels 
(consumption vs. investment) through which remittances can significantly affect Tunisia’s 
growth. In particular, remittances are found to be driven by the need to support migrant 
worker’s families rather than by investment considerations. This suggests the importance of 
remittances as coping mechanism against shocks, without typically turning the recipients into 
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investors, stimulating entrepreneurial activities, rising formal sector employment, and 
generating multiplier effect
 13. Even if they not be used “productively”, a positive and long-
run impact on growth appears robust. In time of crisis, remittances will help families to heal 
and to continue sending their children to school. This type of behaviour may be potentially 
reflecting, in certain circumstances, a preferable investment for the families. However, within 
the context of political and social unrest investors’ disquiets over the economic prospects of 
this country exacerbate, harming the investment climate. What is noticeable these last weeks, 
however, is that Tunisians are witnessing a sharp devaluation of dinar. As a result, the export-
competing companies would be harmfully influenced by the real exchange rate overvaluation 
and the related potential loss of international competitiveness. The adverse effects of the loss 
in external competitiveness can be mitigated by stimulating the internal competitiveness. The 
Tunisian authorities should open different economic sectors to competition, develop a fair 
administrative business environment and undertake proactive reforms, tax benefits, 
organization, governance mechanisms and other regulations to strengthen the involvement of 
Tunisians abroad in national development process. Through a new legal and institutional 
framework for investment
 14
 (law n°71 of September 30, 2016), Tunisia aims to overcome the 
long-winded economic difficulties, to change the current economic model and to adopt a new 
economic model based on efficiency and productivity via the encouragement of investment in 
innovative sectors and sectors with higher value- added and the enhancement of export 
capacity and technological content of the Tunisian economy. This would help to boost the 
competitiveness of the national economy and mitigate the low employment rate and the 
country’s regional disparities. Tunisia is at a turning point today, facing multiple challenges 
but also aspiring to potential opportunities. The new law is expected to stimulate investment 
environment and market opportunities for businesses in Tunisia. 
Last but not least, on the basis of this article’ findings, we cannot affirm that the 
remittances flows are able to fully cushion the uncertainty surrounding the current Tunisia’s 
situation. Certainly they have increased remarkably, affecting directly both the balance of 
payment and the wellbeing of families who receive them, but this situation is exogenous and 
their total impact will depend on policy measures taken to encourage them. Once political 
stability is achieved, a special attention is needed for channeling remittance inflows towards 
                                                 
13
 This can happen but in infrequent cases. Papers that focused on the impact of remittances on investment seem 
very scarce. Generally, migrants come to invest in their country of origin on condition that they monitor 
themselves their investment. For a summary of these studies, you can refer to Bouoiyour et al. (2016). 
14
 For more details about the new law, you can visit this link: http://www.ilboursa.com/marches/tunisie-les-
principales-caracteristiques-du-nouveau-cadre-juridique-de-l-investissement_11291 
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productive investments. This requires learning more about the range of barriers to using them 
for investment and the effective institutions that can effectively guide recipients of 
remittances make the most of the remittances they receive. 
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Appendices 
 
Figure A.1. The IMFs involved of gGDP, REM/GDP, INV/GDP and CONS/GDP  
Restricted period (2000:Q1-2010:Q4) Whole period (2000:Q1-2015:Q3) 
gGDP 
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REM/GDP 
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Overview A.1.  A frequency domain causality test 
The present paper made an attempt to assess the causal linkage between remittances and 
macroeconomic variables through a recently developed signal approach of Breitung and 
Calderon (2006). Use of this approach allows disentangling the Granger causality in the 
frequency domain, and then identify if the predictive power is concentrated at the quickly 
fluctuating components (high frequency) or at the slowly fluctuating components (low 
frequency). This distinction is very important in studying causality. Although conceptually 
interesting, the standard Granger causality test does not permit discerning the variant 
characteristics of the signals involved and which normally play a  significant role on the 
underlying series;  hence the usefulness of the decomposition of data variables into various 
frequencies that may help policy makers in the formulation of the adequate decisions. 
Precisely, the covariance of these variables is disentangled into various spectral components. 
The aim is that a stationary process can be depicted as a weighted sum of sinusoidal 
components with a certain frequency, enabling to evaluate the underlying cyclical properties 
of the times series studied and the linkage between them.   
To review the testing procedure, let us suppose that a two-dimentional time series vector 
 tt yx ,  is generated by the following stationary VAR(p) model: 
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where 1
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1, ...)(
 ppijijij LLL   for 
2,1, ji
 
and  ', tt  ∼ ),0( iid . Note that is positive 
definite and let G be the lower triangular matrix of the Cholesky 
1
'

GG ;  ', tt     is 
defined as  ', ttG  and  )(Lij  for 2,1, ji  are defined accordingly.                                    
Then, the population spectrum of x, denoted by )(xf , can be derived from the previous 
matrix and expressed as follows: 
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The main goal of this technique is to test whether xt Granger cause yt , at a given frequency λ, 
even if we control for Zt ( additional control variables). Geweke (1982) developed a measure 
of causality denoted as: 
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As 
2
12 )(
iwe  is a complex function of the VAR parameters, Breitung and Candelon (2006) 
and in order to resolve this drawback, argued that the hypothesis                        M x→y/Z (ω) = 
0 correspond to a linear restriction on the VAR coefficients. 
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The significance of the causal relationship can be tested by a standard F-test or by comparing 
the causality measure for ω ∈ [0, π] with the critical value of a χ2 distribution with 2 degrees 
of freedom, which is 5.99. 
 
